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Was There a Quiet Revolution? Belarus After
the 2006 Presidential Election
ELENA KOROSTELEVA
The 2006 presidential election in Belarus mobilized a large cross-section of society to
protest against the Lukashenko regime. Although unprecedented, the mass mobiliz-
ation was short-lived, failing to develop into another kind of coloured revolution in
the region. The key to our understanding of the endurance of Lukashenko’s regime
seems to lie in its internal environment, and notably, in the seemingly contradictory
feature of the Belarusian electorate. Not only do they fully identify with the president,
thus effectively legitimizing his politics and policies; they also do so knowingly,
through their strategic learning of how to survive and even thrive under Lukashenko’s
regime. This type of learning, however, may not necessarily lead to a critical reflection
of the regime’s malpractice, and thus is unlikely to challenge its foundations.
‘There will be no rose, orange, or banana revolution in Belarus’
— Aleksandr Lukashenko, 20051
Introduction
The Ordinary
On 19 March 2006 Belarus went through its third consecutive cycle of presi-
dential elections. Despite some vigorous pledges in 2001 by the opposition to
rebound2 and the ‘contagion effect’ of various revolutions in the region, there
was limited expectation that anything ‘out-of-the-ordinary’ might occur in
Belarus.
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Indeed, the 2006 presidential election went in accordance with its previous
‘rehearsals’ in 1994 and 2001, and formally legitimized Belarus’s sole leader,
Aleksandr Lukashenko, in office again. There was, however, some technical
novelty to the process:
1. Lukashenko’s electoral victory literally doubled in size: from 44.8 per cent
(in the first round) in 1994 to 83 per cent in 2006;
2. Turnout also increased significantly: from 69.9 per cent in 1994 to 92.9 per
cent in 2006;
3. The number of election observers grew from just over 20,000 in 2001 to
over 30,000 in 2006;
4. The number of other presidential candidates (except for the constant
presence of Gaidukevich3) doubled: instead of Vladimir Goncharick, a
single opposition candidate in 2001, there were two presidential hopefuls,
Alexandr Milinkevich and Alexandr Kozulin, in 2006;
5. Finally, support for the two opposition candidates literally halved in size:
from 15.65 per cent for Goncharick in 2001 to a combined total of 8.3 per
cent for Milinkevich and Kozulin in 2006.4
Despite these minor numerical changes, the outcome of the election
proved to be an unvarying feature of the Belarus presidency, conveying envi-
able stability of electoral preferences towards the incumbent: arithmetically,
nine out of ten of those who voted in 2001 and in 2006 chose to support
Lukashenko.5
The Extraordinary
Post-election developments in 2006, however, made the third electoral cycle
quite ‘extraordinary’. On the election night, despite bad weather, a crowd
estimated at 10,000–35,0006 gathered in October Square in central Minsk
to protest at falsified election results, to object to the intimidation campaign
unleashed by the authorities prior to the event,7 and, more generally, to
demonstrate their discontentment with the regime. The protest was allegedly
ten times greater than that held in 2001, which gathered 2,000–3,000 demon-
strators. Furthermore, the protest lasted for five days with an average of
150–200 participants continuously present on site until they were brutally
removed by armed anti-riot police on 24 March 2006.8 The camp survived
for five days in freezing weather, poor sanitary conditions and lack of food,
blockaded by the police to prevent outsiders from delivering food and hot
drinks or joining the protestors in moral support and admiration. Many obser-
vers noted a surprising generational unity among the protesters, comprising
both young (and often ‘under-age’) and middle-aged participants. Describing
the March demonstrations, a parent commented: ‘Our children led us on to the
































streets’.9 The number of arrested during those five days ranged between 500
and 1,000 individuals, of whom 392 were subsequently sentenced. As the
OSCE reported, in Minsk alone the number of individuals sentenced in a
single day exceeded a record-breaking 200!10 Also, quite astounding were
both the regional representation at the October Square, and the explicit non-
party character of the protest.
This wave of public discontent was not knowingly orchestrated by the
opposition, and by no means was it designed to overthrow the existing
regime, so rendering invalid any adjectives describing it as a ‘failed’,
‘non-colour’, ‘potato’, ‘jeans’ or any other revolution. This was not initially
conceived or fostered a posteriori as a revolution. Instead, the mass protest
occurred spontaneously, under its own momentum, drawing on the emotional
discontentment of ordinary people rather than the ideological convictions and
organized activities of the opposition. The truly ‘extraordinary’ feature of the
event was its self-mobilization, unprecedented in numbers and in generational
and regional unity. It is asserted that 70 per cent of the population discussed
the event with their close kin,11 thereby amplifying its effect by a factor of
400. The question is whether the occurrence of the ‘extraordinary’ was a mani-
festation of wider changes within the society – perhaps even the weakening of
the regime itself?
This essay investigates the aftermath of the ‘extraordinary’ – that is,
whether the ‘extraordinary’ has engendered any possible spill-over effect on
the political life of Belarusian society since 2006.
There follows a brief overview of civil society’s activities since the occur-
rence of the ‘extraordinary’ in order to qualify its effect, and an examination of
some existing explanations of the failure of the ‘extraordinary’ to broaden its
scope. Our conclusion is that, in order to understand the workings of Luka-
shenko’s regime, it is necessary to appreciate the complex dialectic of the
regime’s ability in learning to survive, and the capacity of the regime’s
environment – both external and internal – to challenge it. In particular, we
emphasize the role of the internal environment: the electorate, which exhibits
the seemingly contradictory feature of knowingly supporting the ‘last dictator
in Europe’.12 The argument relates to the importance of differentiating
between ‘strategic learning’ – as a more general form of knowledge that
equips learners with some basic skills of survival – and ‘deep learning’ that
leads to an ‘enlightened understanding’ of the workings of democracy13 –
an element that the regime’s internal environment lacks at present.
Assessing the Effect of the ‘Extraordinary’
The immediate aftermath of the 2006 election witnessed a certain imperma-
nent rise in civic activities including mass rallies (for example, Day of
































Freedom, Chernobyl Path; Jeans Festival and Solidarity Actions with the
Imprisoned), frequent flash-mobs, internet ‘blogs’, intellectual debates in
non-state media outlets, and the expansion of opposition through a merger
of all opposition parties (except the Christian-Conservative Party of the
Belarus National Front) and youth organizations into the United Democratic
Forces (UDF). It is worth noting that the majority of street activities and the
emergent ‘virtual communities’ were non-party and youth-led – a spill-over
effect of the ‘extraordinary’ mobilization of public discontent during March
2006. The effect of the ‘extraordinary’, however, seems to have declined sig-
nificantly by 2007, so failing to capitalize on the unexpected flash of public
dissatisfaction with regime and to produce any lasting impact on civil
society in Belarus.14
Opposition
Relatively united during the electoral campaign, the opposition did not
succeed in upholding the pledged unison thereafter. Soon after the election,
the authority of Alexandr Milinkevich as the UDF’s single leader began to
erode, undermined by the cacophony of interests, tactics, ambitions and in-
fighting for leadership. Consequently, the united front fissured yet again,
resorting to the ‘old-fashioned’ and unpopular party politics of limited
impact. As a result, the UDF failed to have any tangible impact on local elec-
tions in January 2007, having debated (yet again!) the wisdom of participation
in government-orchestrated events. Those who did participate were more con-
cerned with their canvassing for the forthcoming UDF congress rather than
promoting unity and ideas among the voters.
The convening of the seventh UDF congress seemed to have temporarily
united various factions within the opposition. Nevertheless, devoid of many
new civic organizations, the democratic forum failed to maintain its integrated
fac¸ade soon after its assembly in May 2007. In the light of increasing in-fight-
ing, Milinkevich decided to step down, and his single leadership was replaced
by a rotating chairmanship of ten participating organizations, with four party
leaders co-chairing the coordinating committee.
There were even fewer signs of unity and joint undertaking for the par-
liamentary elections in autumn 2008. The UDF has been struggling with the
lack of motivation to identify potential elections candidates, and it ran out of
both spirit and time to organize a broad-based electoral campaign in order to
break out of its self-inflicted ‘ghetto’.15 On the eve of the 2008 parliamentary
elections, the opposition was organized into three broad informal groupings:
the UDF, Milinkevich’s movement ‘For Freedom’, and Statkevich’s
European Coalition. Although all closely associated and organizationally
interlinked, they nevertheless put forward their candidates independently –
110 from UDF and ‘For Freedom’, and 61 independently from the European
































Coalition – reflecting further their inability to unite forces. A month before
the election, the opposition was still deliberating whether or not to abandon
the electoral platform, struggling to find representation in electoral commis-
sions and to make themselves heard. The result was a predictable failure –
this time in a ‘transparent manner’, as pledged by the president16 – of any
opposition candidate to be elected to the National Assembly on a turnout of
no fewer than 77 per cent of the voting population.17
In other words, the opposition failed to capture and develop the momen-
tum generated by the ‘extraordinary’ mobilization of the population, not
only because of their ill-coordinated actions and personal ambitions, but
also because of what seems to have been a deliberate neglect of new non-
party movements within the society. The short-lived unity of the opposition
has thus somewhat forfeited the legacy of the ‘extraordinary’, confining ‘revo-
lutionaries’ to their self-inflicted ‘ghetto’ of slogans that have limited appeal
or reach to the wider society. Their precarious and ineffective fourteen-year
‘struggle for democracy’ has now come to be perceived as ‘the call of the
West, rather than the voice of Belarusians themselves’,18 a situation that
can be better depicted by a comment from the crowd:
In response to a politically shrewd slogan employed by the opposition
during the 2006 protest, ‘the police are with the people’, a rank-and-
file policeman wisely noted, ‘that’s right, we are with the people, not
with you’.19
This appears to be in a stark contrast with increasingly united pro-govern-
ment public associations. For example, Belaya Rus’, having emerged in the
aftermath of the election, now allegedly boasts over 82,000 members and con-
tinues to grow. In October 2008 it convened its first congress, and aspires to
become ‘the nation’s most numerous public force’, according to its chairman,
the education minister, Alexander Rad’kov.20
Other Forces
Youth movements, defiant of the regime and dissociated from the opposition,
have become a new feature of Belarus’s politics. During the European and
social marches in 2007, for example, young demonstrators formed a separate
column, defying both state instructions and the opposition’s negotiators. Out
of a thousand people arrested during the March protest, most were young
(and often under the legal age), including many who were never politically
active before. Not only did the ‘extraordinary’ mobilize some new youth struc-
tures, such as ‘Bunt’ (Revolt) and ‘Khopits!’ (Enough), it also reinvigorated
the old ones, such as ‘Antifashyk’ (Anti-fascist), ‘Malady Front’ (Youth
Front) and ‘Initsyyatyva’ (Initiative). The Initsyyatyva, for example, by
working with young people face-to-face, succeeded in organizing more than
































50 street actions without being arrested a single time.21 Malady Front recently
celebrated its tenth anniversary by being denied registration five times. Its
members continue to recruit new activists (many of whom are still under
18), to fight openly against the authorities despite a new law interpreting
activities of unregistered organizations as a criminal offence.22 The year
2006 also saw a political merger of one of the most recognizable youth organ-
izations ‘Zubr’ (Bison) which voluntarily joined the UDF to support
Milinkevich.
The opposition failed, however, to capitalize on a new generation of
politicized youth. Conversely, the youth showed little aspiration of joining
‘traditional’ political parties, having adopted direct and more ‘radical’
methods of combating the regime. Possessing limited financial and organiz-
ational resources, the youth is increasingly migrating to a ‘virtual realm’ of
internet politics. For example, many flash-mob campaigns and virtual discus-
sions and ‘blogs’ were launched through the internet. A lot of analytical and
factual video materials about government atrocities became readily available
online, thus counteracting the state propaganda aimed at discrediting civic
activities: ‘As kitchens were for their parents in Soviet times, the Internet
has become a place where young Belarusians interact with others, discuss
events, exchange opinions, and share ideas’.23 This virtual dissent, however,
has limited reach since it is available to only 6 per cent of the population24
– mainly urban – and is now carefully censored by the state.25 The authorities
also have learnt to counteract activities organized through the internet effec-
tively by suspending, interfering with or indeed arresting those who maintain
dedicated websites.
The scale of youth activities declined considerably by 2007, surrendering
to the sophisticated pressure of the government and lacking basic organiz-
ational and leadership skills. Instead, the government-sponsored youth organ-
izations, dominated by the ambitious Belarusian Union of Youth (BPSM),
modelled on the Soviet Komsomol and informally named as ‘Luka-mol’
after the president, have been aggressively expanding their ranks by
vigorously mobilizing school-leavers and university students using various
mechanisms of sticks and carrots. By autumn 2008 the organization boasted
90,000 members in Minsk alone and a total of 490,000 members nationwide,
and was being actively promoted by all state-owned media.26
To sum up, as the foot-soldiers of the protest, the youth movement, feeling
disenfranchized, disenchanted or indeed confrontational, seems to have been
somewhat alienated by the ‘established’ opposition. Youth organizations
lack organizational resources and leadership, and thus find it difficult to
sustain their recruitment. State persecution and government ‘moral work’
with families of youth further hinder their engagement with anti-regime
struggle. Once again, traditional forces have failed to capitalize on the
































effect of the ‘extraordinary’ and to accommodate the rising awareness of poli-
ticized youth.
Politically-motivated demonstrations of small business representatives
and religious minority groups in Belarus added new dimensions to the non-
party street struggle against the regime. Not numerous in their ranks (for
example, the demonstration by businessmen in January 2008 involved only
2,000–10,000 participants),27 they nevertheless bring disruption to the
regime’s propaganda of apparent unity and public contentment. This leads
us to an assessment of the situation regarding non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) in the aftermath of the ‘extraordinary’.
NGOs
On 1 January 2008 the total number of existing (and registered) NGOs alleg-
edly remained similar to that of 2006, amounting to 2,255 organizations,
according to the ministry of justice.28 Both 2007 and 2008 were marked by
a ‘certain departure form the authorities’ practice of destroying independent
structures’.29 This is because the bulk of ‘political NGOs’ were liquidated
by the government during the 2003–5 ‘mopping-up’ campaign, and there is
very little leeway left to register activities from scratch. Furthermore, political
pressure on existing NGOs continues through increased taxation, censorship
and procedural regulations, leading to their self-liquidation, which is not stat-
istically recorded. At the same time, numerous pro-government civic organiz-
ations (government-organized non-governmental organizations: GONGOs)
have been created to boost the statistics.30 The government continues recruit-
ing pro-regime supporters by organizing popular state-sponsored events: the
May Day parade in 2007 supposedly brought out over 200,000 spectators;
Liberation Day (3 July) with dedicated concerts and entertainment attracted
over 450,000 viewers31 – which somewhat belittle the effect and the legacy
of the extraordinary mobilization of March 2006.
The ‘extraordinary’ mobilization of public discontentment during the post-
election period of March 2006 had indeed an awakening effect on civil society
in Belarus. The event was widely discussed in Belarus and abroad, the protests
gathered young and old, brought geographical unity to the demonstrations of
protest and a spill-over effect on a number of activities in subsequent years.
Nevertheless, its legacy was somewhat short-lived, resulting in the failure
(i) of the opposition to unite (it resorted yet again to disparate and unpopular
party politics); and (ii) of new societal groupings to integrate into a wider
resistance movement and sustain themselves organizationally. The post-
‘extraordinary’ situation remains quite the opposite of what a revolutionary
situation would classically envisage, when ‘the lower classes should not
want to live in the old way’ and ‘the upper classes should be unable to rule
and govern in the old way’.32 Instead, the leadership has consolidated its
































grip on power; and the masses remain economically stable in their self-assess-
ment,33 entertained, and supportive of their politically legitimate president,
Aleksandr Lukashenko.
We now examine possible explanations of the failure of the ‘extraordi-
nary’ to gain momentum, by briefly looking at theories of (i) pre-emptive
authoritarianism; (ii) domestic coherence, coercion and scope and inter-
national linkage and leverage; and (iii) unfinished nation-building in Belarus.
Explaining the Failure of the ‘Extraordinary’
A number of theoretical explanations has been advanced in order to compre-
hend the failure of the ‘extraordinary’ to develop into another instance of a
‘coloured’ revolution rallying in Belarus on the ‘contagion effect’ of neigh-
bours, the political backing of the international community and the sprouts
of public discontent domestically. We will briefly focus on the three specific
theories of regime change and survival, in order to generate a holistic expla-
nation of the sustainability of Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus. The notion of
pre-emptive authoritarianism, as developed by Vital Silitski,34 presumes the
regime’s ability to learn to survive by adopting preventative measures to
combat democratic contagion. Over the decade and a half of its struggle
for survival Lukashenko’s regime has perfected the policy of pre-emption,
and, more importantly, is constantly learning to secure its position. There
is a plethora of instruments that the regime can deploy in order to enhance
its survival skills and to learn to strike first. These include (i) institutional
pre-emption – the regime’s ability to consolidate its power by tailoring
and then legitimizing institutional rules to meet the needs of an autocrat, as
well as by eliminating any legal or institutional opportunities for opposition
to develop; (ii) cultural pre-emption – the regime’s manipulation of public
consciousness and collective memory to spread stereotypes and myths to
counteract domestic opposition and international meddling in domestic
affairs; (iii) ideological pre-emption – the regime’s conceptualization of
itself in an attempt to inculcate and legitimize its ruling, and justify its
measures of quelling dissent; (iv) tactical pre-emption – direct actions
leading to attacking or destroying its opponents; and finally, (v) international
pre-emption – by seeking international alliances to withstand the pressure of
international society.
Silitski is absolutely correct in stating that Lukashenko’s regime has
created an unlimited grip on power by actively utilizing principles and instru-
ments of pre-emption. Institutionally, in order to ensure the legality, security
and stability of his authority, Lukashenko (i) re-writes the Constitution,
thereby acquiring unlimited powers (including legislative), and removing
restrictions on his stay in office; (ii) eliminates non-compliant elements of
































society; (iii) installs new structural pillars (the ‘presidential vertical’; police
and armed forces); and (iv) alters the format of other institutions (parliament,
educational establishments, civil society and so forth). Culturally, he (i)
defeats the Belarusian Popular Front’s nationalism; (ii) removes any symbolic
reminders of pre-soviet identity from circulation (replaces the national flag
and coat-of-arms; places limitations on the use and teaching of the Belarusian
language); (iii) promotes Soviet or state patriotism; and (iv) inculcates public
awareness of Lukashenko’s Belarus, vividly embodied in the slogans of his
election campaigns ‘For Belarus’ (2001) and ‘For Independent Belarus’
(2006). Ideologically, he (i) launches the concept of egalitarian state national-
ism, drawing on ‘three essential pillars: Belarus uniqueness, unity and sover-
eignty’;35 (ii) reintroduces ideological education and propaganda in
workplaces; (iii) actively promotes the rise of the BPSM (Luka-mol) by
making its membership a tacit requirement for entry into high education;
and (iv) considers the launch of a ‘Party of Power’, with its prototype,
Belaya Rus’, included in the formation. Tactically, not only did Lukashenko
(i) literally and otherwise decapitate, discredit and demobilize the opposition
by forcing them into their self-exile or indeed ghettoizing them into a manage-
able compound; he has now also (ii) learned to quell any public rebellion
directly and fearlessly, as the pre-2006 intimidation campaign and post-
election events indicated.36 Finally, international pre-emption included Luka-
shenko’s joining the movement of non-aligned states in 2006 and continually
seeking Russia’s political backing37 in order to ensure the ‘international’
legitimacy of his regime.
The art of pre-emption, craftily mastered by Lukashenko, indeed renders
his regime an enviable stability in troubled times of coloured revolutions
drawing on the population’s perceived economic security and social order.
There is, however, one caveat worth noting here: Lukashenko’s regime is
learning to perfect its defences not in advance (independently of any other
variables) but in response to exogenous and endogenous challenges, which
necessitates discussion of both internal and external environment on which
the regime is founded.
These dimensions of the regime’s environment have been theorized by
Way and Levitsky in their studies of (i) cohesion, coercion and scope for
regime maintenance,38 and of (ii) international leverage and linkage in
promoting democratization.39
They contend that domestically Lukashenko’s regime survives on the
moderate cohesion of state authority (the unity and compliance of the state
apparatus) and extremely high scope of power (including security forces
inherited from the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) to be able to pene-
trate and control large parts of society. As a result, internally the regime can
utilize ‘low intensity coercion’ – including surveillance, infiltration of the
































opposition, short-term detention or targeting of opponents on charges of tax
irregularities or legal infringements and so forth – in order to maintain
wide-scale control.40 These ‘low-intensity coercion’ measures give the
regime better chances of survival by preventing the occurrence of high-risk
or conflict situations that might necessitate the open use of force and thus
de-legitimize the regime completely.
With time, however, Lukashenko’s regime began to resort more frequently
to the use of force and mixed-intensity coercion, which may in theory suggest
a weakening of state control over emerging public discontent. This, however,
contradicts persistent public contentment as revealed by opinion polls (see
below), and rapid allayment of the effect of the ‘extraordinary’ amid the oppo-
sition, implying the regime’s further endurance, which again necessitates a
deeper discussion of the internal environment that sustains and fosters the
foundations of Lukashenko’s regime.
For their analysis of the international dimension of democratization,
Levitsky and Way develop a framework of leverage – the government’s
vulnerability to Western pressure – and linkage – the density of communi-
cation ties between participating parties.41 According to this analysis,
various combinations of intensity of leverage and linkage may produce a
desirable democratization effect in a given country: thus, high-intensity lever-
age and linkage may accelerate regime change, while a lower level may retard
such a development.
Although it makes sense as an external conditioning factor of the regime’s
environment, this framework – viewed from a predominately Western
perspective – has specific limitations in application to Belarus. Not only
does it presume a certain imposition (‘pressure’) by the West on a potential
‘partner state’, it also denies the right of negotiation and bargaining to a
recipient over the recipient’s ‘contribution’ and revenues.42
For example, in search of better leverage the EU’s position towards
Belarus has evolved from the politics of isolation (1997), ‘a bench-mark’
approach (1999) and a ‘12-point’ acquis (2006) to arrive finally at a six-
month ‘technical trial’ (2008)43 to probe the grounds of leverage over the
state. All four frameworks essentially embody the same ‘hard governance’
approach associated with limited incentives, little interest in the needs of a
‘partner state’ and practically impossible conditionality, the implementation
of which would inevitably commit Lukashenko to undertaking his own politi-
cal suicide.44 Conversely, continued isolation, a strict visa regime and sanc-
tions, which still remain the official line of the international community,45
and more money-pampering of the opposition,46 will not enhance either
leverage or linkage with Belarus, but instead reinforce further wall-building
against the ‘Western offenders’.
































The fundamental shortcoming of the ‘leverage and linkage’ framework is
its presumption of the right of the international community to act unilaterally
in ‘managing democratization’, without taking account of the perspective of a
recipient, who might have specific internal boundaries which would make it
difficult, if not impossible, for the leverage or linkage to have an effect. In
order for the latter to take root, a more practical and tactically appropriate dia-
logue needs to be established with Belarus, taking into account its internal
environment and geo-political boundaries. As far as boundaries are concerned,
Russia’s neighbourhood and its economic and political backing, even follow-
ing the dispute over gas and oil prices,47 continues to play a far more important
role in defining Lukashenko’s survivability than any dialogue, sanctions and
conditionality exercised by the EU and the US. Leverage and linkage in
relations between Russia and Belarus has been fostered on the basis of
mutual interest, which for Belarus primarily (but not exclusively) means flex-
ible financial recourses that help maintain its economic ‘miracle’.
This finally leads us to a theory of unfinished nation-building, as devel-
oped by Grigory Ioffe.48 The premise for Ioffe’s argument is Belarus’s geopo-
litics: ‘Belarus is not just a pariah; it is a geopolitical one’, and ‘there is only
one way to rectify its geopolitical pariah status and that is to unhook it from
Russia’.49
Indeed, Russia’s influence in Belarus is enormous, both economically
and politically. As a former chairman of Belarusian central bank, Stanislav
Bogdankevich, admitted,
Apart from total energy dependency [on] Russia, the country also
exports 99–100 per cent of her agricultural produce and 50–90 per
cent of her main industrial produce to Russia. This means, if Moscow
were to introduce export tax on Belarusian produce, the whole home
industry would collapse in an instant.50
Continuing Russian subsidies and loans have fostered the so-called Belar-
usian miracle, in the form of an annual equivalent of 11–14 per cent growth of
the country’s gross domestic product,51 allowing Lukashenko to achieve sus-
tained economic welfare (at a time when most Commonwealth of Independent
States – CIS – countries had negative figures), low unemployment rates, and
regular payment of pensions and wages. These policies help to maintain
reasonably stable standards of living and thus largely account for Lukashen-
ko’s considerable popularity, especially among rural, less educated and
elderly voters.52
Besides, on its own conditions, Russia provides Belarus with international
political backing, thereby further legitimizing Lukashenko’s domestic auth-
ority. To quote the Russian ambassador to Belarus Aleksandr Surikov’s
response to the police crackdown on Freedom Day in March 2008: ‘In all
































countries people are imprisoned for political actions, when they violate the law
of the country . . . Many people are trying to give political aspect to these
issues, throwing away the criminal part’.53
According to Ioffe,54 the best way to ‘untether’ Belarus from Russia, and
to undermine the foundations of Lukashenko’s regime, is not by imposing
‘democracy’ externally, or pumping money into a selected or ‘ghettoized’
opposition, or indeed by conditioning any assistance that could ‘free’ the
country economically – in other words, not by ‘traditional’ strategies that
have been in place for over a decade wielding little or no result. Instead, it
should be through the nation-building, ‘imagining’ or awakening of Belarus
as a nation with all independent and sovereign ‘paraphernalia’, which may
foster democratization from within, by raising national public awareness.
That is where a potential difficulty lies. According to Ioffe, Lukashenko is
the embodiment of a large part of the population: ‘he is the person of humble
origin and peasant upbringing, as are many Belarusians’; ‘most Belarusians
. . . speak trasianka,55 and so does Lukashenka’. More importantly, however,
‘most Belarusians have found it problematic to see themselves as a community
apart from Russia, and so has Lukashenka’.56 Not only does Lukashenka’s
personality appeal to the people, but his policies too, ‘particularly his empha-
sis on communalism, a social safety net, and on eschewing privatization,
Russian or Ukrainian style’.57 In other words, support for Lukashenko is not
only stable and comprehensive, but genuine, and based on informed opinions
about the issues that directly concern the population. That is to say, there is a
healthy and legitimate consensus between the people of Belarus and their
leadership. While agreeing with Ioffe’s emphasis on the need to raise national
awareness as part of the wider process of democratization, there must also
be discussion of what kind of nationalism and by what means if one were to
promote Belarus’s independence from Russia: should it be one with or
without Lukashenko? Contemplating the rise of nationalism without
Lukashenko is too far-fetched and hypothetical; nationalism with Lukashenko
seems to be a continuing process, as the events of the period since the gas and
oil crisis indicate. The promotion of Belarus’s independence and sovereignty
is Lukashenko’s raison d’eˆtre, which however is unlikely to affect the
country’s geopolitics (and geo-economics for that matter) vis-a`-vis Russia.58
Belarusians treasure the perceived stability, security and relative prosperity,
achieved under Lukashenko, with the undeniable help of Russia. Can this
be counteracted by the national idea alone, even if it is aided by respective
external ‘leverages or linkages’? This question will be addressed below,
emphasizing the importance of differentiating between ‘strategic learning’
– commonsensical knowledge of survival skills – and ‘deep learning’,
which is necessary in order to challenge the existing relationship between
Lukashenko and the people so as to achieve democracy.
































Discussing the Boundaries of the ‘Extraordinary’
‘Fifteen years ago, . . . Kebich had real power in the country. But did anybody
use to refer to him as “our Slava”? No. But “our Sashka” they did say and
keep on saying all the time. This is regularity: people have a gut feeling
that [Lukashenko] is their man’.59
The theoretical frameworks set out above for comparison have aided our
understanding of the following three principles applicable to Belarus:
1. Its regime is learning to survive and endure not in advance but in response
to respective challenges – internal and external – of the environment on
which it is founded;
2. a decade and a half of external ‘democracy promotion’ has failed to yield
any meaningful results, owing to
3. Belarus’s internal boundaries – cultural and geopolitical-cum-economic –
fostered by the regime.
Hence, the focus of any intelligible discussion of regime change should
primarily be on the internal environment and the factors that nurture the
endurance and consolidation of an authoritarian regime. The specificity of
Lukashenko’s regime lies with the electorate: it is the contentment of many
Belarusians and their identification with the president that defines the
regime’s most enduring feature – its genuine legitimacy: for, as Max
Weber observed, ‘rule is legitimate when its subjects believe it to be so’.60
In what follows, (i) we provide an analysis of the regime’s internal
environment, focusing in particular on the bond between the president and
his people; (ii) we then question the very nature of this relationship, in
order (iii) to realize the importance of differentiating between various
modes of learning that define the prospects of a regime’s survival or change.
(i) The Bond Between the People and Their President
Lukashenko will remain absolutely legitimate if people continue to identify
with him and appreciate his social and economic policies directed at support-
ing communal well-being, security and stability. Positive perception of the
economic situation in the country and popular belief that individual well-
being will only improve under the incumbent authority, indeed, makes the
regime unwaveringly stable.
For example, an absolute majority indicate that their material well-being
has either remained stable or indeed improved in the past two years – even
during the period of troubled relations with Russia, which resulted in higher
prices, lower wages and even job losses (Table 1).61
































A majority also believes that the country is developing in the right direc-
tion (Table 2).
Again, a majority (51.2 per cent) believes that their family life has
considerably improved since 1994. A percentage of those who firmly relate
their hopes with the president in solving economic problems have hardly
altered in fourteen years (48.7 per cent in 1994; 44.4 per cent in 2008).
In June 2006 an absolute majority (60.6 per cent) were confident that their
life conditions would improve considerably under the present government.
When dealing with difficult political choices, the Belarusians tend to
prioritize their material concerns (Table 3).
TABLE 1
















Improved 23.4 21 21.3 14.6 16.6 10.8 15.7
Not
changed
63 64.7 61 66.3 67.1 55.3 57.6
Declined 11.1 12.8 16.8 17.7 15.6 32.4 25
DS/DK 2.1 1.5 1.3 0.8 1.1 0.3 0.6
Notes: DS¼‘no answer’; DK¼‘don’t know’.
TABLE 2


















56.9 61.6 55.7 57.8 50.2 41.2 50.2
Wrong
direction
31 24 29 30 34.2 39.3 34.5
TABLE 3
‘WHAT IS MORE IMPORTANT – ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT OF THE COUNTRY OR
ITS INDEPENDENCE?’ (PERCENTAGES)
June 2004 Aug. 2006 Sept. 2007 Mar. 2008
Economic improvement 73.7 48.5 59.4 64.5
National independence 19.2 41.9 32.2 24.1
DS/DK 7.1 9.6 8.4 11.4
































Furthermore, if one were to choose between economic well-being and
independence, well-being comes first: 65 per cent agreed compared with 24
per cent who disagreed. Clearly, the country is in a situation where personal
security, associated with material well-being and overall stability, plays a
far more significant role than regime’s encroachment on democracy. To
quote Ioffe: ‘Nowhere in the world do leaders who accomplish this get
ousted unless a well-established democratic system . . . is firmly in place’.62
Therefore, the dynamics of people’s positive preferences for Lukashenko
in a future presidential election will not be surprising: he remains the sole
realistic prospect on the Belarusian political landscape (Figure 1).
Why do people vote for Lukashenko? In 2008 they simply believed that he
had been successful in restoring order in society (66.3 per cent), in building an
independent and economically viable state (64.5 per cent), in promoting
collaboration within the CIS (60.1 per cent), in not letting the ‘oligarchs’
rule the country (59.7 per cent), and in fighting crime (58.9 per cent) and
corruption (49.6 per cent). In comparison with Soviet times, in August 2006
people also considered the incumbent authority ‘close to the people’ (30.4
per cent), less bureaucratic (25.5 per cent), strong and reliable (23.6 per
cent) and lawful (23.2 per cent).
FIGURE 1.
‘ IF A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WERE HELD TOMORROW, WHOM WOULD YOU
VOTE FOR?’ (PERCENTAGES)
Source: IISEPS, ,http://www.iiseps.org/poll06.html.; ,http://www.iiseps.org/poll07.html.;
,http://www.iiseps.org/poll08.html., accessed 24 Feb. 2009.
































If we tap into people’s individual responses in focus groups, we find the
same continuity in general allegiances as that revealed by national
surveys.63 Respondents of focus groups in 2001 and 2003 found the president
equally decisive, purposeful, honest, caring, workaholic, and brave. They had
also well absorbed the myths of (i) Lukashenko as the saviour of the USSR
(he alone had voted against its dissolution); (ii) Lukashenko as ‘one of us’,
the man of common people (‘nash kolkhoznik’ – ‘our collective farmer’;
‘he was publicly crying in sympathy with the people’); (iii) Lukashenko as
the fighter overcoming all barriers and triumphing over the ruins of inherited
chaos; (iv) Lukashenko as the catalyst of building brotherly relations with
Russia (‘we need him, in fact the whole Union needs him’). The 2005 focus
groups captured similar attitudes although somewhat more critical and defen-
sive: ‘Everyone criticizes Lukashenko . . . But when an election is approach-
ing, 2–3 months in advance everyone starts defending him. If somewhere one
starts criticizing him there would be a scandal’.64
Some observers also note that the regime seems to have broadened its
social base in recent years. Lukashenko’s support is allegedly growing
among the young, not just the old, rural dwellers and those of limited edu-
cation. As Matskevich observes, ‘Belarusian youths now beginning to
support the regime are proud that respect and [favourable] attitude were not
just bestowed upon Belarus but have been earned or won in fight’.65
These findings indeed corroborate Ioffe’s remark about Belarusians
as truly in tune with their president, with whom they not only identify
personally, but also whose policies they support unequivocally.
However, do the people identify with the regime knowingly?
(ii) Questioning the Nature of Perceived Knowledge
According to IISEPS, in 2006 66.8 per cent of respondents knew about the
post-election protest on October Square; 30 per cent were aware of the Cher-
nobyl Path; 25 per cent knew of the Freedom Day; and 14.4 per cent of the
Jeans Festival; 70.3 per cent discussed the post-election protest with their
families, friends and colleagues. A majority (57.4 per cent) nevertheless com-
pletely disapproved of the protesters’ actions, with one-fifth of the population
remaining totally indifferent. An absolute majority (65 per cent) believed
Lukashenko to be the legitimate president of Belarus. And the same absolute
majority was concerned with rising prices (60.1 per cent) and unemployment
prospects (37 per cent) more than with the state of democracy (human rights
and arbitrary rule) in the country (22.1 per cent).
According to Novak’s focus group findings, ‘the fundamental problem is
that everyone knows – but no one protests. This appears to be Belarusians’
main specific feature’.66 Indeed, the likelihood of protest is 18 per cent,
which has remained relatively stable since 2005.67 Furthermore, the level of
































protest, as argued by IISEPS, ‘is defined first and foremost by the state of
society, featuring public attitudes (degree of discontent, expectation of
change, etc.), rather than by organizational readiness and activity of party
and other political structures’.68 This suggests that the Belarusian electors,
being indeed knowledgeable and discriminate about their choices, are either
not ready or not willing to challenge Lukashenko’s authority, by and large
feeling secure and content about their material needs and moral choices
under his regime:
There have been 14 years as our society has been moving along the new
historical path. The economy has changed – it became market . . . Our
way of life, our clothes, our consumption have improved; our streets
and architecture became more attractive . . . More importantly
people’s psychology has changed: increased their patriotism, faith in
their country and its future . . . all these became possible thanks to the
unique personality of the president, who united around himself the
majority of society, showed simple and clear ways for our
development.69
This is where a ‘specifically’ Belarusian contradiction resides. It is difficult to
reconcile with this overwhelming support the fact that people are fully aware
of the regime’s misgivings including fraudulent elections, corruption and
abuse of law. They are also well informed about the disappearances of
Lukashenko’s political opponents and who is likely to have orchestrated
them. The people also understand why Belarus is called the ‘last dictatorship
in Europe’ by witnessing the regime’s daily beatings, harassment, persecution
and belittling of its own people. All these phenomena nevertheless do not
prevent them from continuing to vote for the president – that is, in support
of his politics and policies.
Why? How can Belarusians knowingly identify with and support
Lukashenko’s regime?
(iii) Different Modes of Learning in Belarus
Given the legacy of past instability and hardship, Belarusians seem to treasure
personal security above all – specifically, above newly attained sovereignty
and personal freedoms and rights. This is duly reflected in their ‘strategic
choice’ of leadership. Belarusians have ‘bread and butter’ daily on their
table; they are in full employment with regularly paid wages and pensions;
they are lavishly entertained by the state, and cared for through various
benefits available in the health and education sectors. They have made their
choice because government does not abuse or harass them individually, and
because they know that, in the absence of any eligible alternative, Lukashenko
is the best bet.
































Strategic learning precipitates basic awareness and declarative knowledge.
It trains how to survive and overcome hurdles with minimal loss. The Belar-
usians are, no doubt, aware of how the system operates under the Lukashenko
regime: how much corruption and arbitrary action there are, and what kind of
informal and personal safety net is required to ensure individual security and
stability. Strategic learning is a cumulative exercise. That is why younger gen-
erations feel less comfortable in Lukashenko’s world of ‘favours’, for they
have not yet attained the requisite level of security in order to live in
austere comfort within the system.
Those who learn strategically are aware of the potential dangers of dissent
and rebellion, and will try to bypass them cautiously and peacefully. Hence,
over 70 per cent of the population would rather stay silent in their discontent
than take to the streets in protest.
Contentment – economic and personal – is unlikely to breed dissent. That
is why Svetlana Aleksievich, in her interview given to Ioffe, commented: ‘The
point is not that we have no Havel, we do, but that they are not called for by
society’.70
Strategic learning indeed yields informed choices, which are somewhat
different from informed opinions that presume understanding and critical
reflection. In Belarus informed choice is fostered predominately through reg-
ularly transmitted state propaganda, producing an effect of ‘regurgitation’
rather than understanding. There are no forums to enhance deeper learning
– that is, a process of learning through debate and persuasion. It is not a
specific feature of Belarusian society: the absence of deep learning is also
common in advanced democracies, resulting in de-politicization and dis-
franchisement. In the case of Belarus, however, it is far more serious as it
fosters further regime consolidation and suppression of dissent.
As Meszaros and Szabo argue, ‘in Belarus, due to the restricted access to
democratic forums and the internal support of the political elite, which stems
from the relatively good economic results of the country, the force of social
movements has been relatively weak’.71 Furthermore, sporadic manifestations
of ad hoc discontent are unlikely to result in mass mobilization against the
regime, in the circumstances of perceived well-being and security: ‘The exter-
nal and internal imbalances or structural problems, even if they are unsustain-
able in the long run, do not lead to social discontent until they have an effect on
the perceived economy’.72
Belarusians’ ‘informed choice’ seems to be based on what one needs to
know in order to survive and do well under Lukashenko’s regime. Informed
choice may lead to the betterment of one’s conditions in all-around chaos,
but it will not make communal living sustainable. That is because any
further quest for knowledge or critical opinion becomes redundant once indi-
vidual security in an autocratic society is achieved.
































Conclusion: Forfeiting the ‘Extraordinary’?
In this essay we have examined the effect of the ‘extraordinary’ mobilization
that occurred following the Belarusian presidential election in 2006. In its
momentum it was unprecedented: un-orchestrated externally, it temporarily
succeeded in uniting disparate opposition forces and drawing larger sections
of society into discussion of the virtues and vices of Lukashenko’s regime.
In its novelty and scale it almost suggested a possible weakening of the
regime.
The spontaneous discontent, however, was short-lived, forfeiting the
opportunity to develop into any kind of revolution. Although engendering
the rise of new forces – a youth movement, business and clergy protestation
– it has failed to have a lasting imprint on the livelihood of Belarusian civil
society.
In the attempt to understand the reasons for its failure to unravel we looked
at various explanatory theories ranging in their focus from the regime’s learn-
ing ability to various conditional external and internal forces that might chal-
lenge the regime. Our analysis led us to conclude that the regime is learning
not in advance but in response to its external and internal environment. The
external environment at present encounters internal boundaries that are too
strong for its influence to be effective. Hence, the key to our understanding
of the workings of Lukashenko’s regime lies predominantly in the internal
environment, and notably in the seemingly contradictory features of the Belar-
usian electorate. The latter not only identify with the president and effectively
legitimize his politics and policies; they also do so knowingly – that is,
through or despite their awareness of gross violations of human rights and
freedoms, and perpetual lies and crimes committed by the regime.
In the attempt to reconcile the seeming paradox, we recognized the import-
ance of differentiating between strategic learning – basic commonsensical
awareness that equips learners with skills to survive and even thrive under
Lukashenko’s regime – and deeper learning: an ‘enlightened understanding’
that would lead to critical reflection of what could be done in order to improve
the economic and political well-being of the nation.
The title of this essay posited a seemingly illogical – given our explicit
conclusions – question: ‘Was there a quiet revolution?’ The answer is posi-
tive, in so far as a new learning experience has been gained not only by the
regime itself but also by the electorate in their striving to live better.
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